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| Issues for Discussion
Definition of the Problem • Defending Indian access for bed linen to the EU market, curtailed by various antidumping procedures and rulings, by using the procedures of the DSU. Analysis • Economic — dumping and market access • Political — India, EU, other WTO members • Commercial — Indian suppliers, EU distributors and customers, EU competitors • Policy — India, EU, other WTO members Alternative Solutions Preferred Solution Required Means • Who does what • Who makes decisions • Who influences those decisions and how The players and their perspectives • Complaining parties — EU producers of bed linen • Defending parties — Indian suppliers of bed linen • EU Commission officials • Indian government officials • WTO members and officials, particularly third parties to dispute • Intermediaries: shippers, brokers, etc. • EU consumers
Background Issues for Discussion Object and purpose of GATT/WTO • Role and interests of developing countries Market access • Economics • Politics • Gaining and keeping it ‘Low-cost’ imports, particularly textiles Dumping and anti-dumping measures • Economic issues • Legal issues • Procedural issues • Challenges for developing countries Dispute settlement • Who and what’s involved • The record under GATT and the WTO • What’s required to initiate or defend a case •
Particular problems for developing countries Exhibit 1 Trade in textiles and the WTO[1] The WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC) 1995-2004 The product coverage, listed in the Annex to the ATC, covers all products which were subject to MFA or MFA-type quotas in at least one importing country. The integration process is laid down in ATC Article 2 and stipulates how Members shall integrate the products listed in the Annex into the rules of GATT 1994 over the 10-year period. This process is to be carried out progressively in three stages (3 years, 4 years, 3 years) with all products standing integrated at the end of the 10-year period. The first stage began on 1 January 1995 with the integration by Members of products representing not less than 16 per cent of that Member's total 1990 imports of all the products in the Annex. At stage 2, on 1 January 1998, not less than a further 17 per cent was integrated. At stage 3, on 1 January 2002, not less than a further 18 per cent will be integrated. Finally at the end, on 1 January 2005, all remaining products (amounting up to 49 per cent of 1990 imports into a Member) will stand integrated and the Agreement terminates. Each importing Member decides itself which products it will integrate at each stage to reach these thresholds. The only constraint is that the integration list must encompass products from each of the four groupings: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products and clothing. The four WTO Members which maintained import restrictions under the former MFA (Canada, EC, Norway and the US) were required to undertake this integration process and to notify to the TMB the first phase of their programmes of integration by 1 October 1994. Other WTO Members were required, first, to notify the TMB if they wished to retain the right to use the transitional safeguard mechanism in the ATC (Article 6.1) and, if so, to provide their first stage integration lists. Fifty-five Members chose to retain this right and most of them provided lists of products for integration. Nine Members, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Cuba, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macau, New Zealand and Singapore decided not to maintain the right to use the ATC safeguard mechanism. They are deemed to have integrated 100 per cent at the outset. Concurrent with the integration process, there is a programme for liberalizing the existing restrictions, that is, for enlarging the bilateral quotas carried over from the former MFA on 1 January 1995 (Article 2.1) until such time as the products are integrated into GATT, at which time the quotas terminate. These former MFA quotas, when carried over into the ATC on 1 January 1995, represented the starting point for an automatic liberalization process set out in Article 2, paragraphs 12-16. The former MFA growth rates applicable to each of these quotas were increased on 1 January 1995 by a factor of 16 per cent for the first stage of the Agreement and the new growth rate was applied annually. The stage 1 growth rate was further increased by a factor of 25 per cent for the second stage on 1 January 1998; and will be increased by a further 27 per cent for the last stage beginning 1 January 2002. To illustrate this process, a 6 per cent growth rate under the MFA in 1994 became 6.9 per cent under the ATC and applied each year 1995/96/97; then it was increased to 8.7 per cent for each year 1998/99/2000/01; and then will be increased to 11.05 per cent for 2002/3/4. For small suppliers (as defined in Article 2.18) the growth factors (16 per cent, 25 per cent, 27 per cent) are to be advanced by one stage. Quotas will be eliminated either when the products concerned are integrated into GATT at one of the stages or at the end of the transition on 1 January 2005. There are additional provisions in Article 2 for early removal of quotas and integration of products. Article 3 deals with quantitative restrictions (or measures with similar effect) other than those under the MFA. Members which had such restrictions in place, which could not be justified under a GATT provision, were required either to bring them into conformity with GATT rules or phase them out within the ten year transitional period, according to a plan to be submitted by the restraining Member to the Textiles Monitoring Body. There is no obligation to eliminate restrictions that are permitted under GATT rules. A key aspect of the ATC is the provision in Article 6 for a special transitional safeguard mechanism intended to protect Members against damaging surges in imports during the transition period from products which have not yet been integrated into GATT and which are not already under quota. This clause is based on a two-tiered approach - first, the importing Member must determine that total imports of a specific product are causing serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to its domestic industry and second, it must then decide to which individual Member(s) this serious damage can be attributed. Specific criteria and procedures are set out for each step. The importing Member must then seek consultations with the exporting Member(s). Such safeguard measures may be applied on a selective, country-by-country basis by mutual agreement or, if agreement is not reached through the consultation process within 60 days, by unilateral action. The quota may not be lower than the actual level of imports for that exporting country during a recent 12 month period, and the action taken may remain in place for up to three years only. If the measure is in place for more than one year, growth shall, with one exception, be no less than 6 per cent. In practice, the special safeguard was invoked on 24 occasions in 1995 by the United States, 8 times in 1996 (Brazil 7, US 1), 2 times in 1997 by the United States, and 10 times in 1998 (Colombia 9, US 1). Article 5 of the ATC contains rules and procedures concerning circumvention of the quotas through transshipment, re-routing, false declaration of origin, or falsification of official documents. These require, inter alia, consultation and full cooperation in the investigation of such practices by Members concerned. When sufficient evidence is available, possible recourse might include the denial of entry of goods. There is also a provision whereby all Members should establish, consistent with their domestic laws and procedures, the necessary legal provisions and/or administrative procedures to address and take action against circumvention. Administration of restrictions during the transition period will remain with the exporting Members and any changes in practices, rules or procedures shall be subject to consultations with a view to reaching mutually acceptable solutions (Article 4). Provisions
relating to the commitments undertaken in all areas of the Uruguay Round
as they relate to textiles and clothing require that all Members
“shall take such actions as may be necessary” to abide by these
rules and disciplines so as to achieve improved market access, to ensure
the application of fair and equitable trading conditions and to avoid
discrimination against textiles and clothing imports (Article 7). If an
exporting Member is found not to be complying with its obligations, the
Dispute Settlement Body or the Council for Trade in Goods may authorize
an adjustment to the quota growth for that country which is otherwise an
automatic growth. The
Textiles Monitoring Body has been established to supervise the
implementation of the ATC and to examine all measures taken under it, to
ensure that they are in conformity with the rules. It is a
quasi-judicial, standing body which consists of a Chairman and ten TMB
members, discharging their function on an ad
personam basis and taking all decisions by consensus. The ten
members are appointed by WTO Member governments according to an agreed
grouping of WTO Members into constituencies. There can be rotation
within the constituencies. These characteristics make the TMB a unique
institution within the WTO framework. In January 1995, the General
Council decided upon the composition for the TMB for the first stage. In
December 1997, the General Council decided upon the composition for the
second stage (1998-2001) with TMB members to be appointed by WTO Members
designated from the following constituencies: (a) the ASEAN Member
countries; (b) Canada and Norway; (c) Pakistan and China (after
accession); (d) the European Communities; (e) Korea and Hong Kong,
China; (f) India and Egypt/ Morocco/ Tunisia; (g) Japan; (h) Latin
American and Caribbean Members; (i) the United States; and (j) Turkey,
Switzerland and Bulgaria/Czech Republic/Hungary/ Poland/Romania, Slovak
Republic/Slovenia. Provisions were made for alternates to be appointed
by the members in each of the constituencies and in some cases second
alternates; there are also two non-participating observers from Members
not already represented in this structure, one from Africa and one from
Asia. Exhibit 2 EU trade policy instruments:
Anti-dumping[2] Existing Community rules were replaced by a new Anti-Dumping regulation which came into force on 1 January 1995. This in turn was updated by Regulation 384/96, which came into force on 6 March 1996. This Regulation incorporates measures agreed in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. It also imposes strict time limits for the completion of investigations and decision-making to ensure that complaints are dealt with rapidly and efficiently. Dumping is often seen to relate to any cheap or below-cost imports, but the reality is more complicated. The 1996 Anti-Dumping Regulation provides for the imposition of anti-dumping duties, but only when the following conditions are met: • a finding of dumping: the export price at which the product is sold on the Community market is shown to be lower than the price on the producer’s home market; • a material injury to Community industry: the imports have caused or threaten to cause damage to a substantial part of the industry within the EC, such as loss of market share, reduced prices for producers and resulting pressure on production, sales, profits, productivity etc.; • the interests of the Community: the costs for the Community of taking measures must not be disproportionate to the benefits. The European Commission is responsible for investigating complaints and assessing whether they are justified. The Commission can also impose provisional measures, and definitive measures for coal and steel products. In all other cases, it is the Council of Ministers which imposes definitive anti-dumping duties. When an industry in the Community considers that dumped imports from non-EU countries are causing it material industry, it may submit a complaint to the European Commission, either directly or through its national government. The Commission then has 45 days to examine the complaint, consult the member states (represented on an Advisory Committee) and decide whether or not there is enough evidence to merit a formal investigation. The case will be rejected if there is not enough evidence or if the complainants do not represent at least 25 % of the total EC production of the product in question. The Commission’s investigation will cover whether or not dumping is taking place, which can be a complex calculation, and also whether dumped imports are causing material industry to Community industry. Measures may also be imposes if imports are hindering the establishment of a new industry within the Community, or there is a clear and imminent threat of material injury. The investigation normally takes no more than a year, and in any case must be completed within 15 months. Anti-dumping
measures will only take place if they are shown to be in the broader
Community interest. Producers, importers, users and consumers are able
to present their views. The member states must then be consulted, and
then the Commission may, within 60 days to nine months, impose
provisional duties. They must not exceed the dumping margin (the
difference between the price on the home market and the price charged on
the EC market). These may last for six to nine months. After that, when
the Commission has completed it’s full investigation, it may, after
further consultation with the member states, impose definitive duties.
Only the Council of Ministers has the authority to decide upon these.
Definitive duties are valid for five years before they expire. If,
however, Community producers demonstrate that removal of duties is
likely to lead to renewed duties and dumping, the Commission may reopen
its investigation. This may also happen if the imposition of duties does
not have the desired effect of removing the injury, for example because
the exporter has absorbed the extra costs, or the pattern of trade has
changed. This may result in changes in the level of duties. A Regulation
imposing anti-dumping duties may be challenged in the European Court of
First Instance, and the WTO dispute settlement procedure may be used to
settle disputes between WTO signatories. If the Community industry feels injured by dumped imports, it can present an anti-dumping complaint to the Commission’s Anti-dumping Service. A “complaint” is a document which contains information showing that a certain product originating in a third country is being exported to the European Community at dumped prices, and that this dumped product is causing injury to the Community industry. Evidence (e.g. invoices, price offers, publications in specialised press, official statistics, etc..) will support the allegations made in the complaint. Export prices are “dumped” when they are at a level below the domestic price in the exporting country. In other words, there is price discrimination: for similar products, a producer charges higher prices on his domestic market than for export sales to the EU. Export prices are also dumped when the exporter sells at a loss. “Injury” (a deterioration in the state of the industry) can be shown in many ways (loss of market share, drop in prices, worsening financial results, etc). This deterioration must be material, i.e., not simply of a temporary or negligible nature (for example, sales at a loss by the Community industry for end-of-year stocks). Furthermore, the dumped imports must be a cause of this injury. “Community industry” refers to European Community producers of the particular product being dumped that are being injured by this dumping. A complaint must be supported by a significant amount of European Community producers. Collectively, these companies must produce at least 25% of the total European Community production of the product being dumped. In general, complainants would contact the producers in other Member States to seek support before filing the complaint. In principle, any “product” can be the subject of a complaint. Anti-dumping legislation, however, does not include services. In general, the dumped products may originate in any country outside the European Community. The only exceptions are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, who, for most products, are excluded from the application of anti-dumping legislation1. If exports from several “third countries” are being dumped, all of the relevant third countries are normally examined in the complaint. The investigation may take up to a maximum of 9 months to come to a provisional determination (if warranted, provisional anti-dumping duties) and up to a further 6 months to come to a definitive determination (if warranted, definitive anti-dumping duties). Definitive anti-dumping measures normally have a duration of five years. In
addition, the Commission has prepared a “Guide on How to Draft an
Anti-dumping Complaint”, which provides detailed explanations and
insights into the contents of anti-dumping complaints. The guide exists
in all official Community languages. If you wish to consult this guide,
go to: europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/compl.htm. Exhibit 3 WTO Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI (Anti-Dumping) — Description[3] In particular, the revised Agreement provides for greater clarity and more detailed rules in relation to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to be taken into account in a determination that dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry, the procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations, and the implementation and duration of anti-dumping measures. In addition, the new agreement clarifies the role of dispute settlement panels in disputes relating to anti-dumping actions taken by domestic authorities. On the methodology for determining that a product is exported at a dumped price, the new Agreement adds relatively specific provisions on such issues as criteria for allocating costs when the export price is compared with a “constructed” normal value and rules to ensure that a fair comparison is made between the export price and the normal value of a product so as not to arbitrarily create or inflate margins of dumping. The agreement strengthens the requirement for the importing country to establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry. The examination of the dumped imports on the industry concerned must include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors bearing on the state of the industry concerned. The agreement confirms the existing interpretation of the term “domestic industry”. Subject to a few exceptions, “domestic industry” refers to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products. Clear-cut procedures have been established on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated and how such investigations are to be conducted. Conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence are set out. Provisions on the application of provisional measures, the use of price undertakings in anti-dumping cases, and on the duration of anti-dumping measures have been strengthened. Thus, a significant improvement over the existing Agreement consists of the addition of a new provision under which anti-dumping measures shall expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a determination is made that, in the event of termination of the measures, dumping and injury would be likely to continue or recur. A new provision requires the immediate termination of an anti-dumping investigation in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis (which is defined as less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price of the product) or that the volume of dumped imports is negligible (generally when the volume of dumped imports from an individual country accounts for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the product in question into the importing country). The agreement calls for prompt and detailed notification of all preliminary or final anti-dumping actions to a Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. The agreement will afford parties the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and to request the establishment of panels to examine disputes. The AD Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure. Unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AD Agreement does not establish any disciplines on dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines. A significant new provision, Article 3.3, establishes the conditions in which a cumulative evaluation of the effects of dumped imports from more than one country may be undertaken. Under the rules, authorities must determine that the margin of dumping from each country is not de minimis, that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and that a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among the imports and between the imports and the domestic like product. Overview Initiation
and conduct of investigations Article 6 sets forth detailed rules on the process of investigation, including the collection of evidence and the use of sampling techniques. It requires authorities to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information and verify the information on which determinations are based. In addition, to ensure the transparency of proceedings, authorities are required to disclose the information on which determinations are to be based to interested parties and provide them with adequate opportunity to comment, and establishes the rights of parties to participate in the investigation, including the right to meet with parties with adverse interests, for instance in a public hearing. Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties may be applied only as of the date on which the determinations of dumping, injury, and causality have been made. However, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains rules for the retroactive imposition of dumping duties in specified circumstances. If the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on a finding of material injury, as opposed to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be collected as of the date provisional measures were imposed. If provisional duties were collected in an amount greater than the amount of the final duty, or if the imposition of duties is based on a finding of threat of material injury or material retardation, a refund of provisional duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for retroactive application of final duties to a date not more than 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures in certain exceptional circumstances involving a history of dumping, massive dumped imports, and potential undermining of the remedial effects of the final duty. Article 17 establishes that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to disputes under the AD Agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a special standard of review to be applied by panels in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard both to matters of fact and questions of interpretation of the Agreement. This standard gives a degree of deference to the factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to prevent dispute settlement panels from making decisions based purely on their own views. A Ministerial Decision, which is not part of the AD Agreement, regarding this provision establishes that its operation will be reviewed after three years with a view to consideration whether it is capable of general application. Annex I to the AD Agreement establishes procedures for “on-the-spot” investigations, which are generally undertaken in the territory of an exporting Member to verify information provided by foreign producers or exporters. Annex II to the AD Agreement sets forth provisions on the use of “best information available” in investigations, specifying the conditions under which investigating authorities may rely on information from a source other than the person concerned. The
Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention, which is not part of the AD
Agreement, noted that the negotiators had been unable to agree on a
specific text dealing with the problem of anti-circumvention, recognized
the desirability of applying uniform rules in this area as soon as
possible, and referred the matter to the Committee for resolution. The
Committee has established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, which
is open to participation by all Members, to carry out the task assigned
by the Ministers. Exhibit 4 Dispute Settlement: the WTO’s
‘most individual contribution’[5] First rulings are made by a panel and endorsed (or rejected) by the WTO’s full membership. Appeals based on points of law are possible. However, the point is not to make rulings. The priority is to settle disputes, through consultations if possible. By July 2000, 32 out of 203 cases had been settled “out of court”, without going through the full panel process. Typically, a dispute arises when one country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO members considers to be breaking the WTO agreements, or to be a failure to live up to obligations. A third group of countries can declare that they have an interest in the case and enjoy some rights. A procedure for settling disputes existed under the old GATT, but it had no fixed timetables, rulings were easier to block, and many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively. The Uruguay Round agreement introduced a more structured process with more clearly defined stages in the procedure. It introduced greater discipline for the length of time a case should take to be settled, with flexible deadlines set in various stages of the procedure. The agreement emphasizes that prompt settlement is essential if the WTO is to function effectively. It sets out in considerable detail the procedures and the timetable to be followed in resolving disputes. If a case runs its full course to a first ruling, it should not normally take more than about one year — 15 months if the case is appealed. The agreed time limits are flexible, and if the case is considered urgent (e.g. if perishable goods are involved), then the case should take three months less. The Uruguay Round agreement also made it impossible for the country losing a case to block the adoption of the ruling. Under the previous GATT procedure, rulings could only be adopted by consensus, meaning that a single objection could block the ruling. Now, rulings are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject a ruling — any country wanting to block a ruling has to persuade all other WTO members (including its adversary in the case) to share its view. Although much of the procedure does resemble a court or tribunal, the preferred solution is for the countries concerned to discuss their problems and settle the dispute by themselves. The first stage is therefore consultations between the governments concerned, and even when the case has progressed to other stages, consultation and mediation are still always possible. 60 days Consultations, mediation, etc 45 days Panel set up and panelists appointment 6 months Final panel report to parties 3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members 60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) Total = 1 year (without appeal) 60-90 days Appeals report 30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report Total = 1year 3months (with appeal) How are disputes settled? • First stage: consultation (up to 60 days). Before taking any other actions the countries in dispute have to talk to each other to see if they can settle their differences by themselves. If that fails, they can also ask the WTO director-general to mediate or try to help in any other way. • Second stage: the panel (up to 45 days for a panel to be appointed, plus 6 months for the panel to conclude). If consultations fail, the complaining country can ask for a panel to be appointed. The country “in the dock” can block the creation of a panel once, but when the Dispute Settlement Body meets for a second time, the appointment can no longer be blocked (unless there is a consensus against appointing the panel). Officially, the panel is helping the Dispute Settlement Body make rulings or recommendations. But because the panel’s report can only be rejected by consensus in the Dispute Settlement Body, its conclusions are difficult to overturn. The panel’s findings have to be based on the agreements cited. The panel’s final report should normally be given to the parties to the dispute within six months. In cases of urgency, including those concerning perishable goods, the deadline is shortened to three months. The agreement describes in some detail how the panels are to work. The main stages are: • Before the first hearing: each side in the dispute presents its case in writing to the panel. • First hearing: the case for the complaining country and defence: the complaining country (or countries), the responding country, and those that have announced they have an interest in the dispute, make their case at the panel’s first hearing. • Rebuttals: the countries involved submit written rebuttals and present oral arguments at the panel’s second meeting. • Experts: if one side raises scientific or other technical matters, the panel may consult experts or appoint an expert review group to prepare an advisory report. • First draft: the panel submits the descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its report to the two sides, giving them two weeks to comment. This report does not include findings and conclusions. • Interim report: The panel then submits an interim report, including its findings and conclusions, to the two sides, giving them one week to ask for a review. • Review: The period of review must not exceed two weeks. During that time, the panel may hold additional meetings with the two sides. • Final report: A final report is submitted to the two sides and three weeks later, it is circulated to all WTO members. If the panel decides that the disputed trade measure does break a WTO agreement or an obligation, it recommends that the measure be made to conform with WTO rules. The panel may suggest how this could be done. • The report becomes a ruling: The report becomes the Dispute Settlement Body’s ruling or recommendation within 60 days unless a consensus rejects it. Both sides can appeal the report (and in some cases both sides do). Appeals Each appeal is heard by three members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body set up by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly representing the range of WTO membership. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms. They have to be individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not affiliated with any government. The appeal can uphold, modify or reverse the panel’s legal findings and conclusions. Normally appeals should not last more than 60 days, with an absolute maximum of 90 days. The Dispute Settlement Body has to accept or reject the appeals report within 30 days — and rejection is only possible by consensus. Even once the case has been decided, there is more to do before trade sanctions (the conventional form of penalty) are imposed. The priority at this stage is for the losing “defendant” to bring its policy into line with the ruling or recommendations. The dispute settlement agreement stresses that “prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members”. If the country that is the target of the complaint loses, it must follow the recommendations of the panel report or the appeals report. It must state its intention to do so at a Dispute Settlement Body meeting held within 30 days of the report’s adoption. If complying with the recommendation immediately proves impractical, the member will be given a “reasonable period of time” to do so. If it fails to act within this period, it has to enter into negotiations with the complaining country (or countries) in order to determine mutually-acceptable compensation — for instance, tariff reductions in areas of particular interest to the complaining side. If after 20 days, no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the complaining side may ask the Dispute Settlement Body for permission to impose limited trade sanctions (“suspend concessions or obligations”) against the other side. The Dispute Settlement Body should grant this authorization within 30 days of the expiry of the “reasonable period of time” unless there is a consensus against the request. In principle, the sanctions should be imposed in the same sector as the dispute. If this is not practical or if it would not be effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a different sector of the same agreement. In turn, if this is not effective or practicable and if the circumstances are serious enough, the action can be taken under another agreement. The objective is to minimize the chances of actions spilling over into unrelated sectors while at the same time allowing the actions to be effective. In any case, the Dispute Settlement
Body monitors how adopted rulings are implemented. Any outstanding case
remains on its agenda until the issue is resolved. Suggestions for Further Reading Dam, Kenneth W., The Rules of the Global Game: A New Look at US International Economic Policymaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Dinan,
Desmond, Ever Closer Union? An
Introduction to the European Community (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener,
1994). Finger, J.
Michael, Antidumping: How it Works
and Who Gets Hurt (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
1993). Jackson, John
H., and Edwin Vermulst, Antidumping
Law and Practice: A Comparative Study (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1989). Jackson, John
H., The World Trading System: Law
and Policy of International Economic Relations 2nd edition
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). Lash, William
H. III, U.S. International Trade
Regulation: A Primer (Washington: AEI Press, 1998). Michalopolous, Constantine, Developing Countries in the WTO (London: Palgrave 2001). Porter, Roger
et. al., eds., Efficiency, Equity,
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2001). Quershi, Asif
H., The World Trade Organization:
Implementing International Trade Norms (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1996). Trebilcock,
Michael J. and Robert Howse, The
Regulation of International Trade, 2d edition (London and New York:
Routledge, 2000). [2] Source: europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/compl.htm. [3] Source: www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#fAgreement
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