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OVERALL STRATEGY
 

ASI should adopt a dual-track strategy for persuading the EU to reform the sugar regime:

Member states strategy: This strategy should be carried out by ASI’s member associations in the 15 EU member states. As explained in the political issues section, it is the Agriculture Council that formulates EU agricultural policy, and member states’ agricultural ministers make up this Council. The only way to influence these ministers is to build support within each state, and therefore a separate, tailored strategy should be created for each state. For the purpose of this project, however, I will lay out only the Italian strategy as an example. The member states strategy should include:

·        Coalition building: In order to build national support for reform of the sugar regime, each association should build support from interest groups that have concerns about the regime, as well as from the public as a whole. Widespread support and commitment in each state will be necessary for reform to actually be enacted.

·        Legislative strategy: Key players in both the legislative and executive branches of government should be targeted at the state level. The main goal is to convince government officials to pressure the agriculture minister to support reform of the sugar regime. The effort should include both direct lobbying and grassroots campaigns.

·        Public relations strategy: This strategy should be used in support of the legislative strategy. It should aim to convince legislators and the public in each state of the need for reform. Key journalists and newspapers should be targeted, as well as journals and TV stations. The campaign should also include academic institutions in order to help raise awareness of the negative economic and social effects of the sugar regime.

 

Brussels strategy: This strategy should be carried out by ASI in Brussels. The strategy should include:

·        Coalition building: In order to persuade the Council and the Commission to reform the EU sugar regime, ASI should join forces with interest groups that share its concerns at a Europe-wide level. Widespread support will be critical if the reform is to be introduced.

·        Legislative strategy: ASI, together with the members of the coalition, should put pressure on the Council, the Commission, and the various interest groups that participate in EU policymaking.



ITALIAN STRATEGY[26]

The main goal of this strategy is to put pressure on Italian Minister of Agriculture Paolo de Castro to support reform of the sugar regime. De Castro’s vote is particularly important because Italy’s vote in the Council is weighted by a factor of ten.

 

Coalition Building

ASI, together with its Italian member associations should organize the Italian Coalition for Sugar Reform (ICSR). As the name implies, the coalition’s objective would be to bring about reform of the sugar regime.

Organizations that represent consumer, business, environmental, and other interests should be included in the coalition. The following organizations, which cover the full political spectrum from the center-left governing coalition to the center-right opposition, should be recruited for coalition membership:

  • The Italian Association of Pastries (AIDI)
  • The Italian Association of Food Products (AIIPA)
  • The Italian Association of Soft Drinks (ASSOBIBE)
  • The Italian Association of Consumers (ADOC)
  • The Italian Association for the Defense of Consumers and Citizens (ATC)
  • National Union of Consumers (NUC)
  • Amici della Terra
  • Greenpeace italia
  • World Wildlife Fund

 

In carrying out the legislative strategy, the coalition should also seek support from the following:

§         Labor Unions

           -          The Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions (the Catholic CISL)

           -          The Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL, Communist-dominated)

           -          The Italian Union of Labor (UIL, Socialists and Republicans)

§         La Confindustria

(Italy’s industrial federation, which represents the interests of large manufacturing and services corporations.)

§         Foodarea

(Italy’s federation of food industries.)

§         “Parastatali”

          -          Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL)

          -          Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI)

          -          Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI)

     (These groups are currently in the midst of privatization and have all had food restaurant and hotel-related business.) 

§         Unioncamere

      (Italy’s Chamber of Commerce, which is headquartered in Rome but has regional, provincial and municipal offices.)

 

Opposition

Both beet growers and the sugar industry will oppose reform of the sugar regime. Beet growers in Italy are represented by the National Association of Beet Growers (ANB), which is connected to the most powerful Italian farmer organizations such as the National Confederation of Direct Cultivators (Coldiretti), and the General Confederation of Agriculture (Confagricoltura), as well as labor unions such as Uil and Cisl.

The sugar industry is represented by the National Association of Sugar Manufacturers (ASSOZUCCHERO). Like ANB, ASSOZUCCHERO is a very powerful group.

The National Association of Fertilizer Manufacturers (ASSOFERTILIZZANTI) will also oppose reform.

 

Legislative Strategy

The objective of the legislative strategy is to build support in the Italian Parliament and Cabinet to persuade Minister Paolo De Castro to support reform of the EU sugar regime.

 

The Parliament

As a result of Italy’s 1992 electoral reform (see Exhibit 3), it now makes sense to target members of Parliament in their districts. ICSR should place special emphasis on lobbying those members that sit on both of the two coalitions within the Standing Committee on Agriculture.[27] The lobbying effort should include:

§         Testimony given by CEOs, association directors, labor representatives, environmentalists and consumer groups.

§         Meetings with legislators.

§         Letter writing campaigns to legislators and their staffs.

§         Debates that engage legislators in the issue.

§         A ‘Dear Colleague’ letter campaign in which district representatives will be encouraged to write to other members.
 

The Green Party, which is part of the center-left governing coalition, should be asked to put additional pressure on other Parliament members, Cabinet members and Minister De Castro.

 

The Cabinet

Because Minister De Castro is likely to be influenced by the Prime Minister’s position on the sugar regime, ICSR should lobby the Prime Minister, as well as selected members of the Cabinet and relevant staff from the various ministries. The lobbying effort should include arranging meetings with and sending informational materials to the Prime Minister and relevant ministry staff.

Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema was a member of the Communist Party until 1989 when it seceded. He then participated in the creation of the more moderate Democrats of the Left Party, of which he became National Secretary in 1994. On the one hand, D’Alema is responsive to farmers and is concerned with maintaining rural lifestyles. On the other hand, he is supportive of consumer and environmental groups because they represent important votes for the political parties of the coalition.[28] Currently, one of his main objectives is job creation.

ICSR should also target the Minister of Foreign Commerce, Piero Fassino, and his staff. Fassino also became a member of the Democrats of the Left Party after the secession of the Communist Party. Given that the EU sugar regime hampers Italian credibility at the WTO and prevents Italy from gaining the benefits of the multilateral trading system, Fassino is likely to support the reform. His support will create additional pressure on Minister De Castro.

Lastly, ICSR should lobby Minister De Castro and his staff directly. Among the staff, Undersecretary Roberto Borroni and Undersecretary Aniello Di Nardo should receive special attention. These two individuals are very important because they are members of the EU Council’s Special Committee on Agriculture.

 

Members of EU Parliament

ICSR’s lobbying effort should also devote special attention to Italian members of the EU Parliament. In particular, ICSR should concentrate on Italian members of the Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development.

The Brussels coalition should also lobby members of Parliament. Although they have no legislative authority vis-a-vis the Council in the agricultural sector, they are important in influencing the Commission in the drafting stage of the policy, and they can also put pressure on the Minister of Agriculture and the Council.

Italian Members of

the EU Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development  

On. Lavarra Vincenzo – Vice-Chairman
On. Berlate Sergio – Member
On. Celli Giorgio – Member
On. Fiori Francesco – Member
On. Procacci Giovanni – Member
On. Cesaro Luigi – Substitute
On. Lombardo Raffaele – Substitute
On. Messner, Reinhold – Substitute
Sig.ra Poli Bortone, Adriana – Substitute
On. Turco Maurizio – Substitute  

 

 

Public Relations Strategy

Because few Italians are aware of the negative impacts of the EU sugar regime, and because citizen support for reform will put pressure on legislators to enact meaningful reform legislation, gaining media coverage of the issue will be crucial. To foster media interest in the sugar problem, ICSR should prepare the following documents:

§         A white paper on the threat that the sugar regime poses to the Italian agri-food industry.

§         Articles on the economic and social impacts of the sugar regime on Italy’s economy, on the potential cost of extending the regime to Central and Eastern European applicants, and on the potential negative effects of the regime in light of the Millennium Round. 

 

The coalition should focus on the following media outlets:

Mainstream Newspapers

The most influential newspaper in the country is Il Corriere Della Sera, which has been in the Agnelli family since the 1920’s and is moderate and sensitive to social concerns. ICSR should also target three other papers that are relatively independent, widely read, and have established themselves as the voice of the Italian people. They are:

  • Il Giornale (operated by ENI)

  • Il Tempo

  •  La Stampa (also in the Agnelli family)

 

In addition, ICSR should target Il Sole 24 Ore. This newspaper is focused on economics and is read by a narrower and more educated public (it can be seen as an Italian Financial Times). 

 

Business Journals

The two most influential Italian business journals are the following:

  • L’Espresso

  • Panorama

 

News Reporters

ICSR should provide information on the sugar issue to influential Italian news reporters with special focus on reporters who view themselves as having a mandate to inform Italians of economic and social inequities. At the same time, ICSR should avoid news reporters that are very “noisy” but are not well respected and could actually be detrimental to the reform effort. The following reporters should be approached:

  • Giorgio Bocca (L’Espresso)

  •  Enzo Biagi (RAI TV RAI 1)

  • Bruno Vespa (RAI 1)

  •  Emanule Scarci (Il Sole 24 Ore)

  • Michele Santoro (RAI 1)

 

Television  

ICSR should focus on TV shows that are hosted by the previously selected news reporters. Bruno Vespa and Michele Santoro host debates between politicians, experts, academics, other news reporters, etc. If these two individuals buy into the idea of reform, they will certainly be willing to take the issue up in their debates. These debates draw large audiences and can have a tremendous impact on citizens and politicians.

 

Academic Institutions  

ICSR should target selected academic institutions with the goal of getting experts to publish articles and reports on the need to reform the EU sugar regime. The following universities are highly respected in Italy. If academics at these schools support reform, Italian politicians and the public at large will be inclined to follow suit.

  • Università Bocconi (Milan)

  • Università La Sapienza (Rome)

  • Università La Normale (Pisa)

  



[26]
For Italy’s political profile, see Exhibit 3. For the Italian Strategy Chart, see Exhibit 24.

[27] See Exhibit 19 for details.

[28] As mentioned in Exhibit 3, a disgruntled intraparty faction can withdraw its support from a coalition cabinet, thereby causing that Cabinet to fall.

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