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IV. Substantive Issue Analysis
Substantive Policy Issue #1: Should USTR assist U.S.
telecommunications firms in expediting Telecommunication
Liberalization in India? The Indian telecommunications market offers enormous opportunity for
U.S. companies. There are only nine million phone lines in India today,
and this number is expected to increase to 60 million by the year 2006—an
increase of over 560 percent. Moreover, the United States is India's
largest investor and its largest trading partner, but according to the
U.S. Department of Commerce, India currently ranks only 32nd
among U.S. export markets. U.S. exports to India in 1996 and 1997
amounted to just US$ 3.3 and US$ 3.6 billion respectively, while U.S.
imports from India during those same years amounted to US$ 6.2 and US$
7.3 billion. Principal U.S. exports include computers, peripherals, and
telephonic and telegraphic parts, equipment and services. Currently, India has just 1.38 telephones per 100 people. The
Government of India has set an ambitious target of six telephones per
100 people, which means that 45 million new telephone lines will need to
be installed at an estimated investment of US$ 60 billion. Although India enacted telecom liberalization policies in 1994,
overall deregulation in India has slowed during the past several years,
and numerous barriers to foreign participation in India’s
telecommunications sector remain. Minor administrative decisions have
served to block foreign investment, as have the country’s unrealistic
and inconsistent policy objectives. Further, India's failure to make
greater commitments in the WTO BTA raises doubt as to the sincerity of
India's liberalization program. If India does not make greater BTA commitments, U.S. companies will
be hesitant to enter the Indian market and an opportunity to offset some
of the U.S. trade deficit with India will be lost. Competitors in
Europe, Australia, Asia will be ready to snatch up contracts if U.S.
companies don’t sign them first. U.S. firms will be willing to invest in modernizing the
telecommunications infrastructure of India only if they can count on
fair and stable rules of the game. They have already lost substantial
amounts of capital and resources in attempting to do business in India. In the absence of stronger WTO BTA commitments on pro-competitive
regulatory principles, it is not clear that India's obligations on
either basic or enhanced telecommunication services will materially
increase opportunities for U.S. participants in India's market.
Accordingly, the Telecommunications Alliance should seek USTR’s
assistance in expediting telecommunication policy reform in India. Substantive Policy Issue #2: Should India Accelerate
Telecom Liberalization? India’s Outdated Monopoly Rationale A number of Indian officials continue to support the government’s
monopoly provision of telecommunication services. In their view, a
competitive system would result in a wasteful duplication of facilities,
inadequate universal services, and "cream skimming." Figure 2 - Forces that Drive Telecommunications
Reform Source: Saunders et. al, Telecommunications &
Economic Development 1. Wasteful Duplication of Facilities Indian officials argue that the telecommunications sector is a
natural monopoly. Because high overhead costs are associated with
establishing a telecommunications network, one supplier can produce a
range of telecommunication services more cheaply than multiple suppliers
can. To avoid wasteful duplication, Indians argue that state telephone
companies should maintain their legal monopoly. Today, this argument is simply inaccurate: Box 1 - Employment, Liberalization and
Developing Countries India's DoT is grossly overstaffed at 24
telephones per employee, compared to 200 to 300 in the OECD
countries. Indian officials and labor leaders fear that
competition would trigger significant labor cuts, but the
evidence suggests that this has not been the case in other
developing countries. Network expansion creates a demand for
labor that has outweighed the trend toward workforce
reduction (Petrazzini and Clark, 1996). 2. Universal Service & Cross-Subsidies Universal service is widely accepted as a legitimate public policy
objective. However, depending on prices, household income, and
consumption preferences, many households choose not to subscribe
to telephone service, and therefore, it is not profitable to provide
service to particularly poor market segments or regions, particularly in
developing countries. With this in mind, India argues that, to achieve
universal service, cross-subsidies are required, and a monopoly is
needed to generate super-normal profits to fund this subsidization.
Cross-subsidies normally flow from international and national
long-distance service to local service, from urban to rural subscribers,
and from business to residential service. There are several problems with this argument: Box 2 – The Effects of Competition on
Universal Service Among developing countries, there are
numerous examples of the positive effect of competition on
universal service. A similar pattern occurs when new technologies such as the
Internet are introduced. In OECD countries, for example, growth
in number of Internet hosts is five times faster in competitive
markets than in monopoly markets. There is nothing to indicate
that the same pattern would not occur in developing countries Source (Box 1 & 2): UNCTAD, World Development
Report 1997 3. Cream Skimming/Cherry-Picking Indian officials have also argued that new entrants in their
telecommunications markets are likely to focus on the most profitable
parts of the market – typically international and national
long-distance and local business telephone services – or on the
largest customers in these market segments. Cream skimming should be viewed not as a negative and unwholesome
activity, but as normal market behavior. "Taking the cream
away," helps correct price distortions and enhance incentives for
cost reductions. India’s Need for Telecommunications Liberalization The rapid expansion of global services and technological advances
places serious pressure on India to create new policies to accelerate
telecommunication liberalization. Sooner or later, on its own initiative
or forced by technological innovation, India will have to compete with
large public operators based in their own domestic market as well as
foreign markets. 1. Domestic Competition 2. International Competition Until quite recently, governments and public operators in India
were fairly effective at blocking international competition in their
domestic telecommunications markets. Since the mid-1990s, however, new
and difficult-to-control sources of competition have been emerging and
spreading rapidly. These include: India could attempt to contain these pressures through regulatory
mechanisms, but there are few policies that can control the expansion of
the new technologies, and unprepared public operators in India will find
it increasingly difficult to compete against the commercial and
technological sophistication and dynamism of international competition.
New information technologies and services will progressively and
irreversibly erode the market position of DoT, VSNL and MTNL, as well as
their profit margins. The financial value of these companies are almost
certain to deteriorate, making them even less attractive to future
investors. Since the 1980s, information has been recognized as a fundamental
factor of production, along with capital and labor, because businesses
are more and more dependent on timely access to physical and
informational inputs from around the globe. The information sector
accounted for one-third to one-half of GDP and employment in OECD
countries in the 1980s, and this number is expected to reach 60 percent
for the European Community by 2000. The simple fact is that efficient and diversified telecommunications
networks are now vital to the smooth functioning of an economy, and
India’s economy is no exception. India’s information-based
industries are expanding rapidly, and these industries are dependent on
fast and reliable information transmission. Indian engineers, for
example, transmit software code from Bangalore to Texas Instruments;
they must be able to transmit large amounts of data securely and at a
reasonable cost if they are to remain competitive internationally. By
reducing telecommunications costs, India’s information industries can
become even more competitive. India’s policies need to be reassessed to better address the needs
of its information-based industries, as well as other industries. Figure 3 - Comparative Unit Investment Costs for Three Inter-City
Transmission Technologies
V. Political Analysis: The United States and India The United States Trade Representative (USTR), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), International Trade Administration (ITA), and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) all participate in efforts to liberalize foreign telecommunications markets. Each has the ability to negotiate bilaterally, as well as through multinational fora.
Members of Congress can help ensure that these agencies give priority attention to improving access to India’s telecommunications market. The following table lists those members who are most likely to be sympathetic to the U.S. industry’s concerns regarding India. Table 14 - Members of Congress Likely to Support the Telecommunications Alliance
Source: Congressional Handbook Each of the Congressmen identified in these tables either has a large U.S. telecommunications company in his district or plays an influential role in House or Senate subcommittees that address telecommunication issues or international trade issues as primary agenda items. TA can count on support from the majority of the individuals listed in Table 14. Although many officials listed in Table 14 will be busy supporting other non-telecommunications issues, an effort should be made educate if not enlist the support of everyone on the list. Each official may have influence with other House and Senate members and staffers who would support such market opening efforts. Associations that will likely lend support to TA’s efforts are listed in Table 15. Each association represents numerous private sector enterprises, most of which will eagerly support market-opening intervention by the U.S. government.
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