outlets are now required to identify all food items that may contain traces of GMOs.[1] Both Austria and Luxembourg have flat-out refused GM trials in their countries, and France is currently being challenged by the EU Commission over its decision to withhold pro forma approval of two strains of GM rapeseed—strains that were approved by the Commission in 1997.[2]  

On the issue of ethics and GMOs, Sweden has taken the lead by demanding that ethical considerations be taken into account in issuing licenses for the marketing of GMOs.[3] Denmark, Spain, and Greece have supported Sweden’s stand on ethics and, further, have vowed never to approve products that may cause resistance to medicinal antibiotics.[4]   

 
Other Countries’ Policies & Opinions on GM Foods 

Although the EU countries have gone the farthest in their protest against GMOs, other countries have also begun to tightly regulate GM products. In Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) recently announced a proposal to introduce mandatory labelling of some 30 food products derived from genetically modified corn and soybeans (beginning in April 2001), and Japanese consumer groups are actively lobbying MAFF to add more products to the list.[5] 

A few days after the Japanese proposal was made public, Australian and New Zealand state and federal health ministers responded to increased public anxiety over GMOs with a communiqué that called for mandatory labelling of all GM foods.[6] 

 
WTO Efforts to Address GMOs  

Within the WTO, the standard-setting rules under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) have some implications for the GMO issue.  More relevant is the WTO’s SPS Agreement. However the current debate between the U.S. and the EU on issues related to food safety, biotechnology, and animal health—including the recent dispute in the WTO over beef hormones—has raised the question of whether the SPS Agreement’s preference for scientific evidence goes far enough to protect consumers from possible health risks.[7]   

Indeed, the EU would like to strengthen countries’ rights to establish higher levels of sanitary and phytosanitary protection than those stipulated by international standards, [8] provided they can be scientifically justified in a comprehensive risk assessment.[9] The EU has also taken the position that countries should be able to rely on the SPS Agreement’s “precautionary principle” (found in Article 5.7) when dealing with scientific uncertainties, such as the effects of biotechnology on human health and the environment.[10] 

In order to resolve these issues, the US and the EU have agreed to support the creation of a fact-finding WTO working group on biotechnology.[11]  However the U.S. has insisted that the group remain solely a fact-finding body without any negotiating authority. Representatives of the U.S. biotechnology industry have warned that any negotiations that seek to improve regulatory processes could lead to a reopening of already ratified agreements, such as the SPS Agreement, and this, in turn, could result in a weakening of current trade rules. The U.S. agriculture industry is also afraid that the creation of a WTO working party could be seen as a “tacit admission” that biotechnology is not covered by existing WTO rules.[12]  Following this logic, the creation of a working party would likely lead to negotiation of a separate agreement on biotechnology, outside the realm of the SPS Agreement, which could mean that biotechnology products may have to face higher standards than conventional products in the future.  
   

OECD Efforts to Address Biotechnology Issues 

In February 2000, the OECD held a three-day Conference on the Scientific and Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods at the request of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized countries. Convened in Edinburgh, the conference was intended to explore the science on whether or not GM foods are safe to eat.  

The conference was attended by four hundred scientists, regulators, and environmental and consumer activists. Its likely outcome is the creation of an international panel on food safety that will be tasked with informing policymakers about GM issues. Sir Robert May, Britain’s chief scientific adviser, has suggested that the panel could be similar to the IPCC, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was established to tackle the challenges of global warming.[13] Sir May has also suggested that the panel should consist of scientists who are both supporters and critics of biotechnology so that a broad range of expertise would be represented.   

Many environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have criticized the conference as doing nothing to solve the uncertainties surrounding biotechnology.  Greenpeace, in particular, has accused the OECD of sidelining critics and failing to include more farmers and other concerned advocacy groups in the meeting.
   

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is a supplemental agreement to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. There were three major sticking points in the negotiation of the Protocol. The first involved the steps a country would be required to take prior to releasing living modified organisms (LMOs) into the environment.  The Miami Group[14] was firmly opposed to the proposed definition of LMOs, which it felt went beyond the scope of the Protocol. The Miami Group held that the Protocol should cover only those organisms that have been proven to pose a direct threat to the environment. 

The second major point of contention between the Miami Group and the rest of the world pertained to the crucial relationship of the Biosafety Protocol to other international agreements, and specifically, the SPS Agreement.  On this issue, the Miami Group has consistently pushed for WTO supremacy over the Convention on Biological Diversity, including the Biosafety Protocol, and for reliance on science-based evidence instead of the safety first approach embodied in the precautionary principle.  

The third main sticking point concerned whether the proposed requirement for advance approval by the importing country should apply to genetically altered agricultural commodities meant for eating or further processing, as opposed to only those meant for planting.  The Miami Group, led by the U.S., argued that commodities intended for consumption or processing, such as corn and soy beans, should not be subjected to advance approval since they do not enter the environment.  The EU and most developing countries have taken the stance that all GM commodities should be included because they contain seeds that can be planted.  Some developing nations even went so far as to demand that the treaty also cover products made from GM ingredients—products such as cornflakes made from modified corn or blue jeans made from genetically altered cotton—though these stipulations were eventually dropped from the final draft of the proposed Protocol.[15] 

In spite of the great divide between the Miami Group and the EU-led Like-Minded Group, the Biosafety Protocol was finally adopted in Montreal in late January 2000 by more than 130 nations.  The Protocol is mainly concerned with protecting the environment and does not specifically address the issue of GM food.  The key requirement of the treaty is that exporters must obtain permission from importing countries before proceeding with the first shipment of a particular LMO meant for release into the environment (such as seeds, microbes, or fish). The requirement does not apply to exports of agricultural commodities intended for consumption or processing.  With regard to labelling, the Protocol only stipulates that international shipments of genetically engineered commodities (not products) must be accompanied by a statement that the cargo “may contain GMOs.”  

One of the most important aspects of the treaty is its inclusion of the “precautionary principle.”  According to the Protocol, countries now have the right to refuse the importation of any GMOs meant for release into the environment—even if there is insufficient scientific evidence to prove that the product will in fact cause environmental harm.

Outlook 

In 1999, rather than push the EU into a trade war over biotechnology, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative chose to focus its energies on creating a positive and productive overall negotiating climate for the WTO Ministerial. Given its main objective of using the Seattle Ministerial as a springboard to successfully launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, USTR was concerned primarily with maintaining the EU’s support for key issues related to WTO operations and procedures.   

However, the issue of biotechnology continues to create conflict between the U.S. and EU, and the need for mutually acceptable rules and guidelines has become increasingly urgent.  Regardless of when a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is or is not launched, the two countries will need to continue to negotiate biotechnology issues at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.  If GMOs are not soon brought into the framework of transparent and unambiguous WTO rules and regulations, the present conflict may well erupt into a large-scale agricultural trade war. In the words of the U.S. Agriculture Secretary, any escalation of the transatlantic disputes over bioengineered crops “could make beef hormones look like the minor leagues.”[16] 

The European View 

From a European viewpoint, the commercial benefit of GMOs is intrinsically linked to the issue of food safety.  As pointed out by Commissioner Byrne in a recent speech, high levels of consumer confidence are necessary in order to boost trade and competitiveness.[17]  To compromise on food safety (i.e. allow the sale and use of GMOs prior to sufficient and adequate scientific testing) would be to gamble with the economic viability of the whole agri-food sector.  

The EU’s agriculture sector produces 600 billion euros worth of goods annually—approximately 15% of total EU manufacturing output. It also provides about 10 million jobs. Even a slight dip in confidence could have a significant economic effect, and the Europeans have plenty of recent examples of how this can happen. Last year, animal feed tainted with polychlorinated biphenyls and furans was sold to 1,700 Belgian farmers and found its way into chickens, pigs, and cattle. The contamination is estimated to have cost that country’s farmers $600 million in sales.  In Britain, farmers are still suffering from the effects of mad cow disease, which has reportedly cost over $5.5 billion in lost exports and culled herds.[18]
  

The American View 

As the world’s largest producer and exporter of genetically modified products, the U.S. is very concerned about the long-term effects of the EU’s de facto moratorium on the marketing of new GM foods. According to U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, the delays are already costing U.S. corn farmers some $200 million annually in lost sales.[19]  The U.S. exports more than $50 billion worth of agricultural products per year, and more and more of the major commodity crops are genetically engineered.[20]   

U.S. farmers have vehemently opposed all mandatory labelling schemes mainly because such schemes require producers to segregate GM and conventional crops and such segregation would be very costly. The Food Biotech Communications Initiative, which represents companies such as Monsanto, Coca-Cola, and Nestlé, has argued that segregation is likely to increase food costs by as much as 150%.[21]  Accordingly, it is not surprising that the U.S. government has threatened a trade war in response to the EU’s demand for segregation and labelling.[22] 

top

Continue to Next Page