| return to : MA Projects | Previous Page | |||||||||||||||||||||
|
The Japanese economy plunged into recession in 1994. It has been slowly recovering ever since but remains weak. Insecurity still prevails in the financial and labor markets. To make matters worse, the government’s debt is increasing. Managing health care costs will be important to future economic recovery, particularly because Japan’s aging population will demand more health care than ever before in the coming years.
(Source:
“Gross
Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 1999 (first preliminary)”, EPA, 1999) Japan’s
health care expenditures are increasing in tandem with the elderly portion of
its population. While total medical expenditures in 1998 were the same as the
previous year, the ratio of health care expenditures to national income
increased slightly (from 7.3 to 7.5 percent).
In 1999, national health care expenditures were estimated at 30.1
trillion yen ($264.2 billion), and the expenditure to national income ratio grew
to 7.9 percent. MHW estimates that health care expenditures will reach to 38
trillion yen ($333.6 billion) in 2000 and 141 trillion in 2025.[31]
The
government is researching various means of reducing health care expenditures.
MHW, for example, is conducting studies of how to reform the
reimbursement and hospital systems. (See the policy analysis section below for a discussion of
how new innovative medical equipment can contribute to reducing health care
expenditures.) 3.
Economic Performance of Japan’s Medical Equipment Industry The
Japanese medical equipment industry has not received as much attention
domestically and internationally as Japan’s major leading industries such as
the automobile and steel industries. The
medical equipment industry, however, is one of the few industries in Japan that
has continued to grow despite the country’s serious recession. In 1998,
domestic production of medical equipment was 1,521.4 billion yen ($11.6 billion
or 0.3 percent of GDP). The domestic demand for medical equipment was 2,028.6
billion yen ($15.5 billion or 0.4 percent of aggregate domestic demand). While aggregate national demand and GDP have declined 1996 to
1998, the country’s domestic demand for and production of medical equipment
have grown steadily.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
However,
despite the fact that imports in 1998 were valued at 834.5 billion yen ($6.4
billion) or 41.1 percent of the total market and despite that imports relative
to total market size have risen steadily in recent years, foreign governments
have often expressed their concern that the Japanese medical industry is
relatively closed. (See Appendix 5 for a comparison of import penetration in the
medical equipment market compared to other high-tech markets.) In fact,
burdensome government regulations combined with Japan’s cumbersome
distribution system have hindered both foreign and domestic Japanese companies
from entering the market.
Japan has reformed some of its medical equipment regulations as a result of negotiations with major trading partners during GATT and GATS reviews of Japanese trade policy. For instance, tariffs on medical equipment were dramatically reduced through multilateral negotiations, and now medical equipment is imported duty free.[32] Bilateral negotiations, notably with the United States, have also been successful in achieving reforms. The time it takes to gain approval for new medical equipment has been decreased, approval procedures have been simplified, and the number of items that do not need formal MHW approval have been increased. Nonetheless, unnecessary bureaucratic procedures in the product approval process and certain business practices continue to hinder the entrance of new medical equipment products into the market. Both also increase the cost of supplying medical equipment, which means that Japan’s total health care bill is larger than it needs to be.
1. Unnecessary Bureaucratic Procedures
In
today’s world of fast paced technological innovation, some products are
outdated almost as soon as they hit the market. The life-cycle of medical
equipment is already down to about two to three years.
[33]
In this environment, it is crucial to a company’s survival for it to get new products to market as quickly as possible and to continually introduce products. Lengthy product approval procedures can significantly diminish a product’s profitability, as well as delay the incorporation of new technologies into the research and design of future products.
Japan’s
approval process is longer than that of any other major developed country; it
usually takes a full year to obtain new product approvals in Japan. There are
several reasons for this:
This
last problem concerning third-party investigations is actually a result of the
U.S.-Japan MOSS talks. It was the United States that asked Japan to commit a
certain part of its new product approval procedures to a third party.[35]
The goal was to improve transparency and to speed up the procedures by
using external sources. However, the situation became worse after the reform.
Before
the reform, MHW’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Evaluation Center (PMDEC)
conducted similar approval investigations for both new and “me-too”
equipment.[36]
But because “me-too” equipment only incorporates previously approved
technology, full-scale new equipment examinations are redundant. “Me-too”
products only need equivalency examinations to ensure that they have the same
effect as equipment that has already been approved.
The redundancy was compounded by the fact that PMDEC was chronically
understaffed and lacked transparency.
In
1995, the Japanese government significantly revised the Pharmaceutical Affairs
Law with the goal of providing appropriate regulations for each type of what is
a growing diversification of medical devices.[37]
As part of the revision, Japan established a new institution, the Japan
Association for the Advancement of Medical Equipment (JAAME), devoted to
examining “me-too” products.[38]
JAAME was supposed to review “me-too” applications, make equivalency
determinations, and report the results to PMDEC (see Appendix 6). However the
new procedures did not shorten (and in some cases even lengthened) the approval
period for “me-too” products because PMDEC still reviewed JAAME’s
findings, and it sometimes rejected these findings and initiated its own
equivalency investigation.
Most
medical equipment is sold in Japan through a complex system of distribution
channels. Although manufacturers directly provide expensive and high-tech
equipment such as CT scans and MRIs, it is common for hospitals to purchase the
rest of their products and equipment from just one or two distributors.[39]
In both the United States and the European Union, the portion of sales that go
through distributors is much smaller and the distribution systems are much
simpler—which means that medical products are often much cheaper because
dealer systems raise the price of medical equipment by 15-25 percent.[40]
A 25 percent drop in prices in Japan could mean a 5.5 percent ($849.1
million) increase in sales.[41]
Problems
surrounding Japan’s hospital system are largely responsible for the complex
configuration of the country’s medical equipment distribution system. These
problems are further detailed in the policy analysis section and Appendix 7.
In addition to the
prolonged process for approving new medical equipment, a number of other factors
impede access to Japan’s market for medical equipment, including MHW’s
overly cautious policies, and both the medical equipment and hospital care
reimbursement systems. MITI’s Millenium Project may help the medical equipment
industry grow in the coming years, but the industry has until now maintained
only weak relations with this ministry—which means that the industry has not
benefited from MITI’s industrial policies.
One
of MHW’s main missions is to improve public health. Since medical equipment
directly impacts human lives, MHW is particularly concerned with ensuring its
safety. The public holds not just
manufacturers but also MHW responsible for any medical accidents that occur due
to faulty equipment. It is not surprising then that, even if a manufacturer has
a good track record for introducing safe products into the market, MHW
scrutinizes all new product approval applications carefully. However MHW has
been somewhat too prudent in accepting new technology, and as a result, medical
manufacturers, both domestic and foreign, have lost opportunities to introduce
new technologies.
A
study conducted by the private management consulting firm, Bain & Company
Japan, shows that MHW’s
policies delay the introduction of new technologies.
The study found that the industry has missed business opportunities for
many years and that patients and the Japanese government have wasted health care
dollars because of these delays. For example, the study found that Japan would
save 5.3 million yen ($ 46,500) per patient by approving Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) for the treatment of tachyarrhythmia (racing
of the heart).[42]
In April 1996, after the completion of the study, MHW finally approved the
product. Other countries had already been using ICD therapy for up to ten years[43]
(see Appendices 8 and 9).
2.
Medical Equipment Reimbursement
Under
the Health Insurance Law and the National Health Insurance Law, the Japanese
government insures medical services (including equipment use fees) for all
Japanese citizens. The government
collects medical insurance fees from the public and pools the money into a
governmental payment fund, such as the Social Insurance Medical Fee Payment
Fund. Doctors and medical
institutions are reimbursed for their services by the payment agency based on
uniform reimbursement prices set by MHW. As previously noted, it is almost
impossible to sell products without reimbursement approval because medical
institutions do not want to use products for which they will not reimbursed.
Unfortunately,
Japan’s reimbursement policy skews competition by creating a situation in
which hospitals are price indifferent in their new equipment purchases.
[44]
Hospitals often do not make cost comparisons when buying equipment
because reimbursement prices usually reflect the sale price of a piece of
equipment; each brand of products is assigned its own reimbursement price (even
though a product has the same function as another product) and the government
guarantees to pay back the purchase cost of equipment.[45]
Under the current reimbursement system, new, more cost-effective equipment is
no more appealing than less cost-effective because the government reimburses
more expensive equipment at a higher rate than more cost-effective cheaper
equipment.
This
system is clearly disadvantageous to newcomers, especially to domestic newcomers
because Japanese manufacturing industries have typically grown by producing
cheaper versions of foreign products. Japan has the skill and technology to
produce cost-effective manufacturing products.
However, the current reimbursement system makes it extremely difficult
for Japanese companies to get new products into the market.
3.
Hospital Care Reimbursement
Japan
is famous for its long hospitalizations. In 1996, the average hospital stay in
Japan was 33.5 days, whereas in the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden
average stays were just 7.5 days, 9.8 days, and 7.5 days respectively.[46]
While this phenomenon is largely due to the fact that the reimbursement
system rewards hospitals for keeping patients in the hospital as long as
possible,[47]
increased use of innovative medical equipment would likely shorten costly
hospital stays. Shortened stays would result in significant cost savings because
the cost of hospitalization accounts for over 50 percent of the remuneration
hospitals receive.
(Source:
“Health Care Reform”, Kawabuchi, 1998)
I.
Procedure
|
Length of Stay |
|
|
|
Japan |
US |
|
PTCA
(coronary balloon catheterization) |
1
week |
2-3
days |
|
Pacemaker
Implantation |
2-3
week |
1-2
days |
|
Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillator Implantation |
1
month |
2-5
days |
(Source:
Heath Industry Manufacturers Association)
4.
The Medical Equipment Industry’s Weak Relationship with MITI
MHW
largely controls the medical equipment industry because medical equipment plays
a crucial role in maintaining public health.
In order to facilitate product approvals, the industry has concentrated
its energies on developing good relations with this agency. However, MHW’s
interest lies in studying advanced medical technology and protecting public
health, not in protecting the industry’s commercial interests.
In
order to gain more support for the development of a strong industry, the medical
equipment sector needs to develop stronger relationships with MITI, the only
ministry that promotes commercial interests and industrial competition.
MITI has succeeded in enhancing the competitiveness of strategic
industries such as the electronics, automobile, and steel industries.
5.
MITI’s Millennium
Project[48]
In
1999, MITI proposed a comprehensive project, the “Millennium Project,” to
help build Japan’s competitiveness in the 21st century. The
project covers 15 technology areas and is geared toward creating “frontier
markets” that will create new market and job opportunities.
One
of the primary goals of the project is to build greater collaboration between
business, universities and the government. Toward this end, the government will
provide generous financial support for research and development and the
development of smoother technology transfers from the research phase to the
product-engineering phase. The project also includes the elimination of
regulatory impediments that prevent business form achieving its full potential.
The
senior services market was selected as one of the 15 target areas. MITI proposes
to promote the development of technologies that help senior citizens lead rich
and fulfilling lives. The project will support research and development within
the medical industry and help the industry introduce new cost-effective and
innovative products into the market.
[27] Mr. Kimura, interview by author, 27 January 2000.
[28] “Gross Domestic Product: The First Preliminary Estimates” (Economic Planning Agency of Japan, 2000), http://www.epa.go.jp/2000/g/qe994/jissuu.gif
[29] “Fiscal Policy Speech by Minister of Finance, Kiichi Miyazawa, 147th Session of the National Diet” (Ministry of Finance of Japan, 2000), http://www.mof.go.jp/english/busget/e1b057.htm
[30] “Main Economic Indicators March 2000” (Economic Planning Agency of Japan, 2000), http://www.epa.go.jp/geturei/2000mar-9.gif
[31] Kawabuchi, Introduction, p. 31.
[32] JETRO, Market Report, p. 1.
[33] “Comments by the Health Industry Manufacturers Association on Identification of Priority Practices” (HIMA, 1999), http://www.himanet.com/publicdocs/301watchlistpetition.html
[34] Mr. Kimura.
[35] ITA,“MOSS Agreement.”
[36] MHW, Guide, p. 31.
[37] MHW, Guide, p. 2.
[38] ITA, “MOSS Agreement.”
[39] ITA, “MOSS Agreement.”
[40] “Medical Technology: Driving Efficiency, Not Costs, in Japan’s Health Care System” (HIMA, 1997), http://www.himanet.com/publicdocs/drivingefficiency.htm
[41] This calculation uses Suzanami and Shujiro’s estimate of Japan’s demand elasticity (.222). 5.5 percent is arrived at by multiplying the 25 percent price reduction by the .222 estimated demand elasticity. Yoko Suzanami, Shujiro Urata, and Hiroki Kawai, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Japan (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), p. 33.
[42] “Examples of Cost Efficient Technologies As Cited in the Bain Study” (HIMA, 1997) http://www.himanet.com/publicdocs/bainexamples.htm
[43] “CASE STUDY: The Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD)” (HIMA, 1997) http://www.himanet.com/publicdocs/icd.htm
[44] JETRO, The Survey on Actual Conditions Regarding Access To Japan - Medical Equipment (Tokyo: JETRO, 1996), JETRO, p. 13.
[45] JETRO, “Market Report”, p. 12.
[46] “The Summary of 1998 White Paper (Japanese version)” (MHW, 1999), http://www.mhw.go.jp/wp/wp99_4/chap-a3.html
[47] HIMA, “Medical Technology.”
[48] “Fiscal 2000 Priority Trade and Industry Policies” ( MITI, 1999), http://www.miti.go.jp/info-e/cIP9982e.html