return to MA Projects | back

Anti-Corruption Measures in the Public Sector

For the Year 1999

TIMETABLE

Anti-Corruption Measures in the Public Sector
For the Year 2000

PACC Fist Year Estimated Budget[1]

Lobbying staff (3 people)                    $120,000

Lobbying Expense                              $  12,500

Travel &Lodging                                $  25,500

Office Expense                                   $  22,500

Coalition Recruitment                         $  15,000

Seminars and Training                        (Sponsored by UNDP and WB)

                                                          Valued at $75,000

Media paid Advertising                       $ 125,000
(TV, radio, newspapers, and billboards)

Web page                                          $     3,000

Surveys and Questionnaires                $     8,500        

                             TOTAL                $ 332,000

 Summary of Obstacles[2]

During Noriega’s 21-year military dictatorship, democracy, transparency and accountability were all severely curtailed in Panama; the government and legislative and judicial systems were instruments of corruption. The purging process has been difficult and lengthy and is far from complete. Indeed, corruption is still widespread in Panama because conditions are still ripe for its existence.

Laws and principles of ethics in government are poorly developed, if they exist at all, and the legal institutions charged with enforcement of these laws are corrupt themselves. Because the opposition party usually limits its attention to non-constructive criticism, it loses credibility when it denounces government corruption. Currently, the independent media remain the only means of exposing corruption.

In this situation, vulnerable and weak institutions play into the hands of political and economic interests, and the motivation to earn income through illicit payments is extremely high because civil service salaries are generally very low.

Panama also has not done an adequate job of disseminating and enforcing rules and regulations. In fact, citizens are usually ignorant of government procedures because laws are not transparent.

This year’s presidential and legislative elections will raise a number of issues that demand the attention of national decisionmakers. Accordingly, the corruption issue might not be a top priority for presidential candidates; corruption reform entails political sacrifices that the government and political candidates may not be willing to take.

An apathetic civil society

The Panamanian public’s weak involvement in the lawmaking process is not surprising given the General Assembly’s policy of not performing systematic and broad-based deliberations with stakeholders and citizens in general.

Due to Noriega’s legacy, Panamanian citizens generally are distrustful of the government and do not believe they can play a role in effecting change. Apathy concerning civic issues is most noticeable among the poorer segments of the population, which lack resources to organize associations and voice their needs to the government. With more spare time and economic resources, other segments of the population participate more, but about 52 percent of the Panamanian population is poor and within this population about 23 percent live in extreme poverty.

Panama’s civil society is generally not well developed because civil liberties were severely restricted during the years of dictatorship. Civil society organizations and local NGOs are not well established and lack resources and capabilities to affect policies. Community groups lack sufficient funds to begin their own development efforts and frequently lack adequate organizational, administrative and technical skills to design and implement activities.

Another fundamental reason for the lack of public participation in Panamanian politics is poor public awareness of individuals’ rights and knowledge of how to make full use of them.

Legislative branch

The technical capability of Panama’s legislative process needs to upgraded because bills often contain loopholes and ambiguities, which in turn erode the credibility and soundness of the legal system. A March 1998 survey conducted by Transparency International revealed that 73 percent of the Panamanian population was not satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Assembly. The public's dissatisfaction with the legislative process might be in part because of its lack of participation in the process. The legislative system does not invite testimony from interest groups. The lobbying process in Panama is still in its early stages of development and citizens are relatively unfamiliar with how to use this as a tool to advance their interests. Usually, only firms’ representatives who have something at stake make use of the lobbying process.

Judicial branch

While the need for a complete overhaul of the administrative justice system was flagged as a top priority after Noriega’s ouster, there has been no action towards implementing real reforms until recently; complete independence of the judicial system has yet to be achieved. Under the current administration, the judicial branch’s performance is the most criticized and is perceived as the least transparent branch of government.[3] In the last three years, 15 judges have been fired and some have resigned alluding to pressure for specific rulings. Further, the institutions responsible for dispensing justice are unable to keep up with civic demand in an expeditious and accessible manner. A 1996 survey by the American Chamber of Commerce showed that Panama had one of the lowest scores for the capacity of the judicial system to provide prompt conflict resolution.[4] A 1995 backlog of 157,000 cases continues to grow at an average of two percent per year, and in early 1998, approximately 60 percent of cases had been waiting for a hearing for more than one year; 41.3 percent had been waiting for over three years.[5]

Political Constraints

The lack of political support or commitment from the government to reform may pose a serious threat to PACC achieving its objectives. Additionally, partisan politics could undermine legitimate efforts to involve civil society in the policy making process. Unwilling to sacrifice their illegitimate benefits, corrupt officials are likely to create barriers to the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The political elite involved in corrupt practices might be willing to make cosmetic reforms to satisfy TI and lending organizations, but these reforms may not be far reaching enough and may be poorly enforced. Because international lending institutions’ work on governance and participation is still limited, it might be difficult to obtain their immediate support for stronger policy measures. Nonetheless, international organizations, particularly trade fora such as the OECD and the WTO, are keen to spotlight the disruptive impact of corruption in international trade and economic development.

Cognitive Constraints

Lack of consensus in the objectives and outcomes expected from the reforms could undermine the successful implementation of the strategy.  Moreover, both the public’s and officials’ mindsets could act as obstacles to reform. Good governance is still a relatively new concept in developing countries, which can make implementation of accountability and transparency policies difficult. In Panama, most citizens have learned about good governance principles and citizen participation in government only since the overthrow of Noriega. Some opponents might even argue that the concepts of participation (citizen's empowerment), transparency and public sector accountability have been imposed by the United States and that the Panamanian system needs a different approach—one more suitable for its resources and capabilities.

Panamaians suspicion and distrust of the government elite could cause them to reject institutional reform. If the public is not involved in the process of institutional reform, the citizenry could perceive it as yet another attempt by politicians to steal the country’s resources. Finally, because many Panamanians view corruption almost as an accepted method of governance, some politicians could seize on this nation-wide acceptance of the status quo as an excuse to ignore and resist the anti-corruption reforms.

• Request to adhere to the Agreement;
• Agree to sign and ratify the Agreement and incorporate it into national legislation;
• Adhere to the 1997 Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery and the Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes of Foreign Public Officials (adopted on April 11 1996);
• Participate fully in the activities of the Working Group on Bribery, including the self-and mutual evaluations for assessing implementation of the Agreement and 1997 Recommendation; and
• Contribute financially to the Working Group on Bribery.

In February 1999, the Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions began assessing whether participating countries’ legislation conforms to the Agreement. In 2000, it will begin country examinations to determine the effectiveness of national enforcement practices.

Bibliography

1-      American Chamber of Commerce, Survey on conflict resolution in the Latin American judicial system, 1996.

2-      Ardito-Barletta, Nicolás, Visión Estratégica Preliminar para el Desarrollo de la Región Interoceánica, Autoridad de la Región Interoceánica, July 1995.

3-      Feketekuty, Geza. Principles of Sound Regulation in Services: The key to long term economic growth in the new global economy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, October, 1998.

4-      La Prensa, Suplemento El Corruptómetro, June 25, 1998.

5-      Langesh, Peter, Rick Stapenhurst, and Jeremy Pope, The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption, the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1997.

6-      Langesh, Peter, Damian Kato, Mohamad Kisubi, and Jeremy Pope, Good Governance in Africa: A Case Study from Uganda, the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1997.

7-      North-South Focus, "Panama’s historic transition brings high hopes, uncertainties," (University of Miami), Volume VI, Number 1, 1997.

8-      Nunberg, Barbara, World Bank Discussion paper. p204, 1995.

9-      Procuraduría de la Nación, Transparencia Internacional y UNDP,

10-   Transparencia Internacional. La Hora de la Transparencia en América Latina: El Manual de Anti-Corrupción de la Función Pública, Ediciones Granica, 1998, p. 125.

11-   The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank. Good Governance in Africa. A Case Study from Uganda. 1997.

12-   The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption,  1997, p.5.

13-   The InterAmerican Development Bank, Study of the Panamanian Judicial System. January 1998.

14-   The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, October 1998.

15-   TI Newsletter, The C-word rap song, September 1998, p.16.

16-   www.alca.co.cr/Espanol/ponencias/instituciones/transp.htm (Submission of position paper of Transparency International for the IV Business Forum )

17-   www.defensoriadelpueblo.gob

18-   www.ustr.gov (Foreign Trade Barriers Report on Panama)

19-   www.oecd.org (Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials).

20-   http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption

21-   www.oas.org (Convention Against Corruption)

22-   www.wto.org (Working Group on Transparency on Government Procurement)

23-   www.icac.org.hk (Independent Commission Against Corruption)

24-   www.transparency.de (TI Source Book).