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Liberalization and Privatization Reforms Strategy
for Quantum Investment Fund Vladimir Gololobov M.A. Project Scenario
Analysis of Policy Issues in the Russian Telecommunications Sector
Analysis of Commercial Issues
Analysis of Economic Issues
Regulatory and Legal Analysis
Political Analysis of Stakeholders
Recommendations and Strategy
Exhibits SCENARIO
In
my Masters’ project, I assume the role of consultant to George Soros’
Quantum Fund. Quantum Fund helped initiate the privatization of the
Russian telecommunications holding company “Svyazinvest.”
The management of Quantum Fund requested that I prepare a
strategy to convince Russian authorities to promote the privatization
and restructuring of Svyazinvest. These moves would be part of a larger
process of liberalizing the telecommunications sector, and would help
economically integrate Russia with the world. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Quantum Fund is owned and managed by George Soros, a businessman
and philanthropist committed to free market reforms.
Quantum Fund owns 53%[1]
of Mustcom Consortium, which owns 25% of Svyazinvest, the state-run
Russian telecommunications holding company. The Russian government owns
75% of Svyazinvest, and is considering selling a 25% stake. By
supporting further privatization of Svyazinvest, Quantum Fund would
protect its original $1 billion investment. Political reality dictates
that sufficient privatization will only occur concurrently with liberal
market reforms in the telecom sector. Thus, Quantum should advocate both
privatization and liberalization simultaneously. From
a commercial standpoint, Quantum Fund should support liberalization
reforms in the Russian telecommunications sector to increase
competition, transparency, and predictability, and promote a level
playing field for private, foreign, and state companies. The current
telecom regime and government control over Svyazinvest’s subsidiaries
constrain the company’s market potential. Quantum Fund can achieve
better long-term profitability in a free market environment, where
profits are determined by market forces rather than arbitrary
non-transparent regulatory decisions. These reforms will meet WTO
provisions on cross-subsidization, interconnection, and monopolistic
regulations. Conforming to these provisions will accelerate Russia’s
accession to the WTO. Privatization
and liberalization in Germany and Chile expanded the telecom market, and
increased profits of dominant providers.
[2]
Financial projections show that Svyazinvest profits will increase to
$1.7 billion in 10 years, making it possible for Quantum Fund to
recuperate its investments entirely in 8 years, as opposed to 25 years
under the current regime. Quantum Fund is convinced that reforms will
result in higher profits, and will increase the value of Quantum’s
shares in Svyazinvest. Privatization will protect Quantum’s existing
investment, increase its share of ownership and control, and attract
more operating capital.[3]
Liberalization will allow Svyazinvest to compete under free trade where
prices are determined by market forces.[4]
Reforms will remove heavy social obligations from Svyazinvest
subsidiaries. As a result of reform, Svyazinvest subsidiaries will be
able to expand their market shares to data transmission, Internet, and
mobile services. Quantum Fund’s manager, George Soros, is committed to
both privatization and liberalization in spreading free market reforms
in emerging markets. Mr. Soros would not seek privatization alone,
simply buying into a monopoly, and relying on continued monopoly
protection. The government sale of 25% of Svyazinvest, along with telecom
liberalization, will ensure the continuity of reforms both in the
telecommunications sector and in Russian industry as a whole. The
Russian government should proceed with the next bidding contest as soon
as possible. By giving private companies a larger stake in Svyazinvest,
the government will attract private and foreign capital, investments,
and credits. Privatization will help cure the underdevelopment of
telecommunications, and the financial demise of the regional Svyazinvest
subsidiaries. The government will be reluctant to privatize Svyazinvest and open
Russia to foreign telecom companies unless liberalization also takes
place. Liberalization will increase competition and transparency, create
a level playing field among foreign and domestic companies, and
encourage new entrants into the market. Experience in such countries as
Germany and Chile demonstrates that telecom market reforms attract
foreign and domestic capital, and improve telecommunications
infrastructure. Telecom liberalization is closely related to the issue of sectoral
monopolization. In Russia, regional telecommunication providers obtain
control over local line networks. However, their small size and scales
of operation are responsible for a low rate of capitalization. Low
capitalization dissuades needed investments, which are essential for
expansion to the more lucrative and value added services. This results
in monopolization of fixed line services, and of mobile phone service in
some regions. Often
the government uses its control over Svyazinvest to achieve social
objectives at the expense of the company’s profits. Pricing
regulations imposed by the federal body reinforce the monopolization of
the sector, since cross-subsidization is not prosecuted, and reasonable
interconnection rates are hard to enforce. Cross-subsidization occurs
when monopolies cover losses in local calls by increasing fees for long
distance calls. Enforcement of an adequate pricing policy is hampered by
local authorities, and by the difficulty in controlling the large number
of telecommunications providers. Cross-subsidization helps preserve a
state run monopoly in Russia. All of these practices are outlawed under
the WTO provisions; therefore they will raise serious concerns of
Russia’s partners at the accession negotiations. Russia will be
required to comply with WTO provisions on regulation in
telecommunications. These provisions correspond with interests of
potential investors and service providers, and with Russia’s long-term
interests. An
effective pro-competitive policy in the Russian telecommunications
sector is crucial for the country’s overall economic development, and
for Russia’s successful completion of WTO accession procedures. To
ensure that such policy is implemented, the country must revise some
regulatory aspects of its legal framework and launch a comprehensive
sectoral reform of telecom regulations. This reform will attempt to make
the legal and regulatory framework more transparent and secure for
investors, and provide the public with better service at a reasonable
price. New regulations should be compatible with the WTO principles
outlined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Specifically
the reform should include the following components:
The
following legal reforms should be proposed in a package:
Despite advantages to investors, common citizens, and key Russian
sectors as a whole, reform implementation will face the following
obstacles:
Although the demand for high quality telecom services is high,
liberalization and privatization in telecommunications is of little
public interest. Many are wary of the economic liberalization of the
last decade, and are prejudiced against further liberalization efforts.
The public needs to be convinced of the advantages of liberalization and
privatization. Regarding
the legal aspect of privatization, Quantum Fund and its allies must
address a new federal bill on a dispute between the State Duma and the
government. The State Duma is attempting to control the privatization of
large state-run enterprises significant to the Russian economy. The
dispute is an obstacle to privatization and may delay the bidding
contest on Svyazinvest. Since
Quantum Fund is a foreign company, it should base its strategy on
telecom reforms to build a coalition of like-minded Russian interest
groups that favor free market reforms in telecommunications. The
proposed organization, the Coalition for Reforms in Russian
Telecommunications (CRRT), should include the Interros Group, a group of
Russian companies with extensive private holdings in media and
manufacturing. Interros owns 10.7% of Mustcom, and shares Quantum’s
interest in Telecom privatization for increased control of the telecom
sector. Interros has developed extensive relations with politicians, the
executive branch, and legislators. Together with Interros and the
Quantum Fund, the CRRT should implement the following comprehensive
strategy:
BACKGROUND
ANALYSIS
Quantum
Fund and its Mustcom partners own 25% of Svyazinvest.
The remaining 75% of shares are in government possession. Svyazinvest
subsidiaries control over 90% of the Russian telecom sector, which is
largely underdeveloped due to monopolization and lack of transparency.
Low phone line penetration and poor service quality stall business
transactions, and create a significant barrier to trade development. The
current non-transparent regime and weak legal regulations create
opportunities for corrupt practices, posing an obstacle to Russia’s
WTO accession. History of the Privatization and
Restructuring Process Until 1993, the Russian
telecommunication network was fully controlled by the Russian Ministry
of Telecommunications. In 1993, local network operators were privatized
so that each region received at least one telecommunication provider,
and more than 80 companies were established. A Russian telecommunication
holding company “Svyazinvest” was formed in September 1995. The main
objective of the company is to attract investments to develop the
regional telecommunications networks, and improve the competitiveness of
local providers. Svyazinvest controls 89 regional telecommunication
providers (“electrosvyaz” companies), 3 municipal networks, 3 long
distance and international telecommunication providers, telegraph
companies, and the international telecommunication provider “Rostelecom”.
This makes Svyazinvest the largest shareholder of one of the largest
telecommunication networks in the world. In the first round of telecom
privatization, the Russian government is supposed to keep 50% of the
Svyazinvest shares, with the remaining shares intended for sale at the
auctions. Despite Svyazinvest being presumably an independent company, the
government, as the largest shareholder, has great influence on its
policy, decision-making, and management strategy. In July 1997, the
government sold 25% shares of the Svyazinvest holding for $1.875
billion. The tender was won by the Cyprus based consortium, Mustcom,
which included George Soros’ Quantum Fund, Russian Uneximbank (owned
by Interros Group), MFK, the Renaissance Capital Investment Fund,
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, and Morgan Stanley. The money raised went
almost entirely to the government budget, with Svyazinvest retaining
only $95 million. In June 1998, the Russian government announced a decision to sell another
25% (minus two shares) of Svyazinvest stock. The government would retain
controlling interest, owning slightly over 50%. The Commission hoped to
sell it for $1.1 billion and attached investment obligations of $400
million, making the total price of $1.5 billion. At that moment,
Svyazinvest was among the most profitable Russian companies, with a net
profit of $1.2 billion in 1997. However, as a result of the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia,
the tender was cancelled. Telecommunication providers’ debts were
increasing, and the fall in the dollar/rouble rates resulted in a major
devaluation. Russian carriers were not solvent to pay foreign producers
for imported equipment. At the end of 1998, 35 of 89 Svyazinvest
companies finished the year in the red.
Quantum
Fund presently owns 53% of Mustcom. Quantum Fund has been increasing its
share of Mustcom by buying shares from partners, most recently in August
2001. This demonstrates Quantum’s commitment to the Russian
telecommunications market, and confidence in liberalization and
privatization reform. Mustcom presently owns only 25% of Svyazinvest,
making it a minority shareholder dominated by the 75% share of the
government. However, if the government agrees to sell an additional 25%
(minus two shares), Mustcom will attempt to buy them. In that case
Mustcom, while not having controlling interest, would be a near equal
partner, with an investment that yields significant influence.[5] Sectoral
Overview
The
telecommunications infrastructure of Russia is not sufficient to handle
the demands of the country’s population. Over 6 million Russians are
currently on the waiting list to receive phone lines. By the year 2005,
the list will rise to 8 million[6].
The telecom infrastructure is characterized by inadequate capacity, low
penetration (21.3%), poor call completion rates (56% of long-distance
calls are incomplete)[7],
and a lack of modern communications services. The Russian economy has
inherited a telecommunications infrastructure in urgent need of
modernization. Inadequate
Capacity Prior to 1992, a mere 0.15%[8]
of GNP was devoted to telecom infrastructure investment. The network has
weak intercity, interregional and international connectivity, trunk line
bottlenecks, and limited regional interconnectivity. Low
Penetration and Call Completion Rates Main line penetration is low throughout Russia, and telephone
densities are considerably lower than those of most other European
countries. The basic network has roughly 22 million telephone lines and
34,000 switching stations. The national penetration rate is about 21.3
lines per 100 people. Only 2.5 million lines have digital switches, the
rest are served by outdated crossbar technology.[9]
The network is still poorly prepared to serve the needs of the general
population or the emerging business community. Lack
of Modern Communication Services Until recently, the Russian public network had only one significant
international exchange in Moscow. Although access can now be made
through one of three gateway switches, they are insufficient to handle
the current load of 110 million calls per year[10].
Businesses used to enjoy many international service options, and many
companies used to hold licenses from the Ministry of Telecommunications
for international communications in European Russia. Unfortunately, the
Ministry of Telecommunications has recently dictated that this service
can only be provided via Rostelecom, the Russian long distance carrier. The long-distance network for calls within Russia is a mixture of
radio relay, cable and satellite. Of the 1.2 billion long-distance calls
made annually, only about 44 percent of domestic calls are successfully
completed. In Moscow, the city network (MGTS) and intercity telephone
network (MMT) have long been inadequate for international business. This
condition is changing with the introduction of newer technological
equipment and foreign investment. However, these changes are slowed by
investment risks associated with non-transparent and arbitrary policy in
telecom. Initially,
foreign joint venture participants in Russia were mainly European
(British, Belgian, Scandinavian). However, such American providers as
Direct Net Telecommunications, Americom Business Centers, and Global
TeleSystems Group have also attempted joint ventures. AT&T and
Sprint offer calling card and E-mail/Internet services. The Moscow
market is clearly more competitive, with rates leveling. Outside of
Moscow, the situation is quite different. While some larger cities are
following Moscow’s footsteps, most of the country has difficulty
communicating with Moscow and other Russian cities. Areas outside Russia
are virtually inaccessible. To improve the situation, new telecom technologies, such as VSATs
(small stand-alone satellite trans-receivers) could be used to provide
private telecom services to offices, factories, and areas unreachable
via existing networks. These technologies require significant
investment, which the Svyazinvest subsidiaries lack. Recent
Introduction of Western Technology The
first cellular system appeared in the early ’90s. The lifting of COCOM
restrictions initiated these changes. Recently, such new technologies
as fiber optic and radio relay transmission, high-speed digital switching,
and communication privacy have become available to support the development
of the Russian telecommunications infrastructure. The
development of the telecommunications network is directly linked to
overall economic and societal development in Russia, and Russia’s integration
into the world economy. Fast development of telecommunications increases
national welfare and security, encourages GDP growth, and promotes progress
in science, health care, culture, and industry. As a result, Russia
could easily become one of the largest world markets for telecommunications
goods and services. [1] Svyazinvest’s Annual Report 2001. [2] See profit projections on p. 35. [3] See p. 28. [4] See p. 43. [5]
Ingram, R., Accounting:
Information for Decisions, 2nd edition, South- [6] Svyazinvest’s Annual Report 2000. [7]
Report on Indicators of Service Quality 1995-2000. Ministry of [8]
Neuman, W., The Future of Russia's Telecommunications
Infrastructure: [9]
Neuman, W., The Future of Russia's Telecommunications
Infrastructure: [10]
Kazachkov, Mikhail, On
Certain Problems in the Russian Communications |